FRHI Hotels & Resorts, originally Fairmont Raffles Hotels International, was the Toronto-based parent that placed Fairmont, Raffles and Swissôtel inside one luxury-hotel system from 2006 to 2016.
Position
FRHI Hotels & Resorts, originally Fairmont Raffles Hotels International, was the Toronto-based parent that placed Fairmont, Raffles and Swissôtel inside one luxury-hotel system from 2006 to 2016. It belongs in the Library because it joined three established lineages without erasing their names, then made long-term management contracts, distribution and development pipeline more important than direct ownership of hotel real estate.
The group was not the founder of any of its three final brands. Its historical importance lies in combination: Canadian railway and city hotels, a Singapore-centred luxury collection and a Swiss international chain became one contract-led platform before passing together to LHL-460 · Accor.
Classification
This is a Part II historical group record, not a current hotel brand. FRHI was a parent and operating platform above separately positioned guest-facing brands. Its portfolio included managed hotels, leases, a very small owned perimeter, development contracts, joint-venture interests and residential extensions.
The register status “dissolved” means that FRHI ceased to exist as an independent controlling group after the Accor acquisition. It does not mean that Fairmont, Raffles or Swissôtel disappeared; all three names survived the transaction.
The Relevant Dates
The immediate prehistory began on 30 September 2005, when Colony Capital completed its purchase of the Raffles International hotel business. On 30 January 2006, Fairmont announced an agreement under which Kingdom Hotels International and Colony would acquire Fairmont and combine it with Raffles. The transaction closed in 2006 and produced the group later styled FRHI Hotels & Resorts.
Qatari Diar affiliates acquired 40% of the capital in 2010. Accor announced its agreement to acquire FRHI on 9 December 2015 and completed the transaction after shareholder approval on 12 July 2016.
What Ended
What ended in 2016 was the independent parent-level allocation of capital, contracts, technology and development among the three brands. FRHI's shareholders exchanged their position for cash and newly issued Accor shares, and the brands entered Accor's larger luxury organisation.
Individual hotel contracts did not all reset on that date. Owners still owned their buildings, leases still carried their obligations, and long management agreements continued under the new parent system.
The Name
Fairmont Raffles Hotels International stated the original proposition directly: a company built around the Fairmont and Raffles organisations, with Swissôtel already inside the Raffles perimeter. The shortened FRHI Hotels & Resorts later reduced the hierarchy implied by placing two brand names in the corporate title.
FRHI was principally a business-to-business identity. Guests booked Fairmont, Raffles or Swissôtel; owners and developers dealt with the parent platform behind those flags.
The Raffles Precondition
FRHI could not have been assembled without Colony Capital's prior purchase of Raffles Holdings' hotel interests. The July 2005 agreement covered fifteen Raffles hotels and twenty-six Swissôtels in thirty-five destinations for approximately USD 1 billion.
Completion transferred 100% of Raffles International Limited directly to Colony at an enterprise value reported as SGD 1.72 billion. That transaction provided both an Asian luxury name and an international upscale network before Fairmont entered the combination.
The 2005 Raffles Perimeter
At transfer, Raffles International described a network of forty-one hotels and resorts under two brands. Fifteen belonged to Raffles Hotels & Resorts and twenty-six to Swissôtel in the sale announcement; by January 2006 the Fairmont announcement described thirty-three Raffles-system properties, including twenty-three Swissôtels.
The changing count is a dated perimeter, not evidence that one source is necessarily wrong. Closings, exits, openings and the distinction between operating and contracted hotels can alter a private group's headline within months.
The Fairmont Transaction
On 30 January 2006, a Canadian acquisition company owned by Kingdom and Colony agreed to buy all outstanding Fairmont shares for USD 45 each in cash. The price represented a 28% premium to the 4 November 2005 closing price cited by Fairmont.
The buyers intended to combine Fairmont with Colony's Raffles portfolio. The announcement nevertheless said Fairmont would remain a Canadian-headquartered hotel management and ownership company and Raffles would retain its independent brand identity.
The 2006 Economics
Fairmont reported an expected value of approximately USD 3.9 billion for its transaction including debt, and approximately USD 5.5 billion when the Raffles combination was included. These are enterprise-level transaction values, not a simple cash price paid for hotel buildings.
The distinction matters because Fairmont carried management companies, real-estate interests, investments, contracts and debt. The combination joined corporate rights and obligations as well as famous hotels.
The Combination Thesis
The initial thesis was scale without brand erasure. Fairmont brought North American depth and Canadian landmark hotels; Raffles brought a small luxury collection rooted in Singapore; Swissôtel supplied a wider city-hotel network across several continents.
The three identities could share procurement, owner relations, development, sales, technology and capital while preserving different promises to the guest. FRHI was therefore an endorsed portfolio system rather than a single uniform chain.
One Hundred and Twenty Hotels
The January 2006 announcement projected a combined leader with 120 hotels in twenty-four countries. Fairmont then described eighty-seven luxury and first-class properties and about 34,000 rooms in its managed portfolio; Raffles was described as owning and managing thirty-three properties.
That arithmetic explains the headline, but not a common ownership relation. Some hotels were managed, some franchised, some linked to equity interests and some directly held.
Toronto and Singapore
The platform joined two established operating centres. Fairmont's corporate structure and senior management were in Toronto, while Raffles International entered the transaction from Singapore with the Raffles and Swissôtel systems.
FRHI's Toronto headquarters became the parent centre, but the combination depended on retaining regional expertise. Centralisation could create scale only if it did not flatten the local knowledge embedded in the brands and hotel teams.
Three Different Lineages
The final portfolio united three histories that had not been designed together. Fairmont included the Canadian Pacific hotel estate and the older Fairmont management name. Raffles took authority from Raffles Singapore and a collection developed around that landmark. Swissôtel began as a Swiss international hotel company and had entered Raffles Holdings in 2001.
FRHI's task was not to invent a common past. It was to make different pasts commercially interoperable.
Fairmont
LHL-261 · Fairmont Hotels & Resorts supplied the largest brand and much of the combined group's North American weight. The lineage includes the Canadian railway hotels traced separately through LHL-486 · Canadian Pacific Hotels.
Registered houses carried into the wider system include LHL-H-415 · Fairmont Banff Springs, LHL-H-416 · Fairmont Chateau Lake Louise, LHL-H-125 · Fairmont San Francisco and LHL-H-121 · The Plaza New York.
Raffles
LHL-260 · Raffles Hotels & Resorts supplied the highest-positioned, smallest collection. LHL-H-111 · Raffles Singapore gave the brand an unusually powerful anchor: a single historic house whose name could be extended to new destinations.
The corporate history before Colony's purchase belongs primarily to LHL-484 · Raffles Holdings. FRHI inherited that work; it did not originate the Raffles name or the flagship's restoration.
Swissôtel
Swissôtel supplied international city-hotel breadth between Fairmont's grand-hotel scale and Raffles' smaller luxury collection. It had entered the Raffles organisation before Colony acquired the hotel business.
The supplied register carries no verified standalone LHL code for Swissôtel. This master therefore names the brand without inventing one. Its absence from the register is a coding fact, not a judgment on its importance to FRHI.
Delta at Formation
Fairmont entered the 2006 transaction owning Delta Hotels, then described as Canada's largest first-class hotel management company, with thirty-eight managed and franchised properties and approximately 11,400 rooms. Fairmont's earlier portfolio count therefore included a fourth operating name.
Delta was not retained as one of FRHI's three final luxury brands. It should be recorded as an inherited but transitional perimeter, not silently folded into Fairmont.
The Delta Disposal
On 2 October 2007 a wholly owned subsidiary of British Columbia Investment Management Corporation acquired Delta Hotels Limited from Fairmont Hotels & Resorts. That sale removed the Canadian first-class brand from FRHI early in the group's life.
Marriott later agreed in January 2015 to acquire Delta's brand, management and franchise business from a bcIMC subsidiary for CAD 168 million, approximately USD 135 million. Marriott's later purchase was not an FRHI disposal, but it identifies where the separated business went.
The Final Brand Portfolio
The operating brand list at the 2015 sale agreement and 2016 closing was complete at three names. LHL-261 · Fairmont Hotels & Resorts was the largest. LHL-260 · Raffles Hotels & Resorts was the smaller luxury collection. Swissôtel supplied international city-hotel breadth and has no verified standalone register code.
Delta had already left. Fairmont Heritage Place and residential uses were extensions of the operating system, not a fourth core hotel brand in the Accor transaction.
Brand Separation
The 2006 announcement explicitly preserved Fairmont's and Raffles' identities, and the 2016 Accor announcement again presented Fairmont, Raffles and Swissôtel separately. FRHI's architecture worked because the parent did not demand a common guest-facing name.
This separation allowed a railway château, a Singapore colonial landmark and a contemporary business hotel to share infrastructure without claiming to offer the same cultural experience.
The Parent Platform
At parent level FRHI could combine owner development, contract negotiation, sales, marketing, distribution, loyalty data and support functions. The value of the platform was therefore partly invisible at the hotel door.
That invisibility is characteristic of modern hotel groups. The parent can be commercially decisive while the guest sees only the house and brand.
Asset-Light Direction
FRHI's final portfolio was overwhelmingly contract-led. At acquisition, 108 operating hotels were reported under very long-term management agreements, while only six were leased and one was owned.
The figures show why “FRHI owned 154 hotels” is misleading. It owned brands, management companies, contract rights and selected investments; most hotel real estate belonged to other owners.
Managed Hotels
Under a management agreement FRHI or a brand operating company ran the hotel for its owner and received fees under a long contract. The owner normally supplied the real estate and major capital; the manager supplied standards, people systems, commercial infrastructure and operating control defined by agreement.
Management created recurring fee value without requiring FRHI to purchase every building. It also made owner relations and contract duration central corporate assets.
Ownership Interests
Asset-light did not mean asset-free. Fairmont entered the combination with real-estate interests in twenty-one properties and an investment interest of about 24% in Legacy Hotels Real Estate Investment Trust, alongside land and residence-club activities.
Over FRHI's life, properties and interests could be sold while management contracts remained. “Owned,” “managed” and “branded” must therefore be tested separately for each hotel and date.
Leased Hotels
A lease placed more operating and fixed-payment risk with the group than a management agreement. At closing, six hotels were reported as leased.
Leases remained a small minority of the system, but their existence prevents FRHI from being described as a pure fee-only manager. They also help explain why a portfolio count alone cannot reveal capital exposure.
The One Owned Hotel
The acquisition materials reported one owned hotel in the final perimeter. That single figure dramatises the change from Fairmont's earlier mixed owner-operator structure to FRHI's later contract-led platform.
The reviewed public summary does not identify that property with sufficient certainty for this master. It is therefore recorded as a count, not assigned to a named house by inference.
Residences
Fairmont entered 2006 with FHP Management Company and Fairmont Heritage Place, a private-residence-club business. Raffles later developed residential extensions represented in the register by LHL-R-260 · Raffles Residences.
Residence branding could extend fees and owner relationships beyond hotel rooms, but a branded residence was not necessarily owned by FRHI. Development ownership, sales entity, residence management and hotel operation could belong to different parties.
Distribution
FRHI's scale made the three brands more useful to owners and guests. A broader network supported international sales, corporate accounts, reservation traffic and cross-brand recognition while preserving separate positioning.
The system was especially valuable where the brands were geographically complementary. Fairmont's North American concentration could be connected to Raffles and Swissôtel demand in Asia, Europe and the Middle East.
Loyalty Data
At closing, Accor described an FRHI customer base of about three million loyalty members, approximately 75% of them in North America. The concentration made FRHI attractive not merely as a set of trademarks but as a body of customer relationships.
Customer data also formed a major integration opportunity. Linking that base to Accor's distribution could change acquisition, recognition and cross-selling without changing the name over each entrance.
Contract Duration
The operating management contracts had an average remaining term of nearly thirty years in the acquisition materials. Such duration turns a signed agreement into a long-lived economic asset, subject to performance tests, owner rights and local law.
The pipeline therefore carried more than future room count. It represented prospective fee streams whose value depended on hotels actually opening and contracts remaining effective.
Geography at Sale
The 2015 materials placed the portfolio in thirty-four countries across five continents. The operating network was reported at 115 hotels and approximately 43,000 rooms, with forty further hotels in the pipeline.
Another closing account gave 154 hotels and resorts, including forty under development, and more than 56,000 rooms including pipeline. The register retains the range of 154–155 because the public presentations use different counting snapshots.
North America
Forty-two operating properties were reported in North America. This was the largest regional concentration and one reason Accor described the acquisition as a major expansion in the market.
North America also accounted for most FRHI loyalty members. The transaction gave a European parent access to a customer and owner base that would have taken years to build organically.
Europe
The 2015 acquisition material counted twenty-six operating properties in Europe. The region contained both historic luxury houses and city hotels, making it a meeting ground for all three brands.
The Savoy in London and LHL-H-149 · Fairmont Hotel Vier Jahreszeiten Hamburg illustrate the prestige side of the estate; Swissôtel supplied broader metropolitan distribution.
Asia-Pacific
Twenty-eight operating properties were reported in Asia-Pacific. Raffles Singapore remained the symbolic centre, while Swissôtel and new Raffles projects supplied a wider regional network.
The Asian component prevented FRHI from being merely a Canadian group exported abroad. It was built through a prior Singapore corporate system whose brands, people and contracts entered Colony ownership before the Fairmont acquisition.
Africa and the Middle East
Seventeen operating properties were reported across Africa and the Middle East. Fairmont had entered Africa in 2005 by assuming management of five Kenyan hotels and had already established a Middle Eastern presence.
The region also mattered through ownership: Kingdom Holding and later Qatari capital connected the parent company to investors and development relationships beyond North America.
South America
The acquisition material counted two operating properties in South America. That small base shows that worldwide presence was uneven.
FRHI's map was global, but its density and brand recognition varied by region. The pipeline was intended partly to correct those gaps rather than simply add more hotels where the group was already strong.
City and Resort Hotels
The operating network mixed gateway-city hotels with resorts. City properties supported corporate demand, meetings and year-round visibility; resorts could command leisure rates but carried seasonality and destination risk.
The mix made FRHI more resilient than a single-format chain, yet it also complicated standards and capital planning. A mountain château, urban tower and island resort do not share the same operating calendar or refurbishment cycle.
Heritage Flagships
Accor's completion announcement highlighted The Savoy, Raffles Singapore, Fairmont San Francisco, The Plaza, Fairmont Le Château Frontenac and Le Royal Monceau Raffles Paris. The examples show that transaction value was concentrated not only in scale but in names with independent cultural authority.
FRHI's parent platform benefited when those houses generated attention, while the houses benefited from global sales and operating support. The relationship ran in both directions.
Registered Houses
The Library maps FRHI through individual hotel records including LHL-H-111 · Raffles Singapore, LHL-H-121 · The Plaza New York, LHL-H-125 · Fairmont San Francisco, LHL-H-149 · Fairmont Hotel Vier Jahreszeiten Hamburg, LHL-H-163 · Fairmont Le Montreux Palace and LHL-H-209 · Fairmont Peace Hotel.
These links record houses that intersected the system. They do not claim that FRHI owned each building.
Fairmont's Pre-Combination Expansion
Fairmont added seven hotels to its managed portfolio in 2005. It assumed management of The Savoy in January, added five Kenyan hotels in May and rebranded a Newport Beach hotel in July.
This growth came mainly through management, not a programme of buying every property. FRHI inherited an expansion method already moving toward contract-led scale.
Operational Risk Without Ownership
Fairmont's 2005 filing recorded severe Hurricane Katrina damage at the Fairmont New Orleans but said the financial impact was not expected to be material because Fairmont held no ownership interest in the property.
The example clarifies the asset-light bargain. The manager still faced closure, brand disruption and lost fees, but the building loss principally belonged to the owner.
The 2010 Capital Change
In April 2010, affiliates of Qatari Diar agreed to acquire 40% of Fairmont Raffles Holdings International for a reported USD 847 million. Reuters reported that Kingdom Holding's interest would fall from 58% to 35%.
Qatari Diar became the largest shareholder. The transaction changed the capital behind the platform without replacing its three guest-facing brands.
Capital for Growth
Kingdom said the 2010 proceeds would fund current and future expansion. This makes the owner change part of the operating history rather than a detached securities event.
In a contract-led group, capital still matters: new management agreements may require key money, minority investment, guarantees, pre-opening resources or renovation support even when the parent does not buy the whole hotel.
The Seller Constellation
By the 2015 sale agreement, Accor identified Qatar Investment Authority, Kingdom Holding Company and Oxford Properties, an OMERS company, as FRHI's sellers. The final public announcement focused on the continuing Accor stakes received by QIA and Kingdom.
The reviewed sources do not establish Oxford's entry date and exact FRHI percentage with the same clarity as the 2010 Qatari transaction. This master therefore names Oxford as a disclosed seller without reconstructing an unsupported intermediate cap table.
The Development Pipeline
FRHI brought forty hotels under development, about 13,000 planned rooms. The operating network had 115 hotels and about 43,000 rooms in the December 2015 presentation.
Pipeline should not be read as opened inventory. It was a set of contracts and projects subject to finance, construction, conversion and owner performance. Its value was real but conditional.
Growth Evidence
Accor's purchaser presentation showed FRHI management fees growing at a compound annual rate of about 10% from 2010 to 2015 forecast, RevPAR at about 4%, and economic EBITDA rising from roughly USD 20 million in 2010 to an estimated USD 120 million in 2016.
These figures supported the acquisition case, but they were presented by the buyer and included forecasts. They are not treated here as a substitute for audited FRHI public accounts.
A Private Company Record
After 2006, FRHI was privately controlled and did not publish the continuous public-company disclosure Fairmont had supplied before acquisition. The surviving record is consequently strongest at transaction dates.
Network size, contract mix and purchaser estimates are unusually visible; annual profit, debt evolution and brand-by-brand performance are not equally transparent in the sources reviewed.
The 2015 Agreement
On 9 December 2015, Accor announced an agreement to acquire 100% of FRHI. The transaction was designed to bring Fairmont, Raffles and Swissôtel into Accor's luxury portfolio and strengthen Accor in North America.
It was a purchase of a parent platform and its rights, not merely a trademark licence. Management contracts, customer data, personnel, leases, investments and development agreements travelled with the corporate perimeter.
The Consideration
The agreed consideration was USD 840 million in cash plus 46.7 million newly issued Accor shares. At announcement, Accor valued the shares at about USD 2.0 billion using a one-month volume-weighted average share price adjusted for the excluded 2015 dividend.
The resulting implied enterprise value was USD 2.9 billion after adjustments for net debt, joint-venture debt and other debt-like items.
Why the Price Varies
The register notes reported prices of USD 2.6 billion, USD 2.7 billion and USD 2.9 billion. These need not describe identical measures or dates. The announced USD 2.9 billion was an implied enterprise value based partly on a market value for the shares; the value of stock changed by closing.
Accor's first-half 2016 report recorded the cash at EUR 757 million and the issued shares at EUR 1.732 billion using the 12 July opening price. Media totals can therefore differ through exchange rates, share-price dates and whether debt-like adjustments are included.
Strategic Rationale
Accor bought immediate credibility in global luxury, a substantial North American presence, heritage flagships, long management contracts and a forty-hotel pipeline. Building that combination brand by brand would have required far more time.
FRHI gained a larger reservation, loyalty and development platform. The price reflected the expectation that the brands would earn more inside Accor than they could as a smaller independent group.
Synergies
Accor expected approximately EUR 65 million of annual revenue and cost synergies. The stated levers were hotel profit maximisation, more efficient marketing, sales and distribution, and lower support costs.
Synergy is not automatic value. It depends on integration, owner acceptance, system migration and the ability to preserve brand distinction while centralising functions.
Integration Cost
The December 2015 presentation estimated approximately EUR 120 million of implementation cost and expected full synergies within three years. This is the cost side of a transaction often narrated through portfolio size alone.
System conversion, organisational redesign and commercial integration require cash and management attention before the projected savings arrive.
Closing
Accor shareholders approved the capital increase at the 12 July 2016 meeting, and Accor officially announced completion that day. FRHI's vendors received the cash and shares specified by the agreement.
QIA held 10.4% and Kingdom Holding 5.8% of Accor after closing. Their economic interest in the hotel platform therefore continued through the buyer rather than ending in an all-cash exit.
Governance After Sale
QIA received two Accor board seats and Kingdom one. The acquisition thus moved assets and contracts into Accor while also moving former FRHI owners into the governance of the successor group.
That structure explains why the transaction is both an acquisition and a share exchange. The sellers ceased to control an independent FRHI but became anchor shareholders of its successor.
The Luxury Organisation
Accor created a wider luxury structure around the acquired brands and appointed Chris Cahill to lead luxury brands and the FRHI integration. The organisation also included Accor's existing luxury and upscale names.
This was an integration office, not evidence of a new People author. Corporate responsibility for combining systems does not by itself meet the Library's authorship test.
Brand Survival
Fairmont, Raffles and Swissôtel survived because their names held more guest value than FRHI's parent identity. Accor announced the acquisition through the three brands and their landmark hotels, not through a plan to convert them to one master flag.
FRHI therefore disappeared successfully in one sense: the parent could be absorbed while the portfolio architecture remained legible.
Acquisition Accounting
Accor's 2017 purchase-price allocation assigned final FRHI goodwill of EUR 865 million, USD 959 million, EUR 68 million above the provisional amount at the end of 2016. EUR 812 million went to HotelServices and EUR 53 million to the hotel-assets perimeter later associated with AccorInvest.
Goodwill records expected value beyond separately identified net assets. It is not cash held by FRHI and not proof that the expected value was ultimately realised.
Losses and Impairments
The first-half 2016 report recorded a EUR 12 million loss on currency hedges used for the USD 840 million cash payment and a EUR 13 million negative adjustment to the consideration's fair value. These were Accor transaction effects, not FRHI operating losses.
The final allocation also recognised a EUR 39 million impairment on land at a Bermuda hotel property, EUR 12 million of additional contingent liabilities and EUR 23 million of additional deferred tax liabilities. Again, these are acquisition-accounting findings, not a reconstructed FRHI income statement.
Predecessor and Successor Map
LHL-484 · Raffles Holdings supplied the Raffles and Swissôtel business sold to Colony in 2005. LHL-486 · Canadian Pacific Hotels supplied much of the Fairmont lineage. FRHI joined those histories in 2006.
LHL-460 · Accor became the corporate successor in 2016. LHL-260 · Raffles and LHL-261 · Fairmont continue as brand records, while Swissôtel awaits a verified standalone code in the supplied register.
People Disposition
No new People nomination is made from this group record. Colony, Kingdom, Qatari and Accor principals structured or financed major transactions, but the present evidence does not show that one of them personally created a hospitality model demonstrably copied by others.
Sébastien Bazin and other office-holders have already been considered and declined under the Library's strict authorship rule. Canadian railway-hotel authorship belongs with LHL-486 Canadian Pacific Hotels; Raffles founders and restoration authors belong with LHL-484 Raffles Holdings and the relevant house records.
What FRHI Contributed
FRHI's contribution was organisational. It demonstrated that three inherited brands could share a long-contract operating platform, expand through third-party capital and retain distinct historical identities.
The model was not unique to FRHI, and the company did not invent asset-light hotel management. Its importance is the particular bridge it created between Canadian, Singaporean and Swiss systems and the scale at which that bridge entered Accor.
Assessment
FRHI was a decade-long corporate vessel whose value outlasted its name. It reduced direct hotel ownership, accumulated long management contracts, connected complementary geographies and carried a large development pipeline into a global parent.
Its weakness as a historical subject is also part of its significance: the parent was less visible than its brands and, as a private company, less transparent than the Fairmont corporation it replaced. The record must therefore follow contracts and capital as carefully as hotel names.
Candour
Public sources disagree on the terminal portfolio at 154 or 155 hotels and on transaction values commonly reported between USD 2.6 billion and USD 2.9 billion. This master preserves those differences and explains the likely basis: timing, pipeline treatment, exchange rates, share-price dates and enterprise-value adjustments. It does not force one false precision.
The reviewed record does not provide a continuous audited FRHI profit-and-loss series, a complete year-by-year cap table, the identity of the one owned hotel at closing or a contract-level list sufficient to classify every property. Pipeline hotels are not treated as opened. Named hotels are not assumed to have been owned merely because FRHI or one of its brands managed them. Swissôtel is left without an LHL code because none is verified in the supplied register.
Sources
Signed source titles below are active hyperlinks. Accessed 6 September 2026.
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission · Fairmont Hotels & Resorts Inc., 2005 Annual Information Form
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission · Fairmont announces agreement to be acquired by Kingdom Hotels and Colony Capital, 30 January 2006
Hotel Online · Colony Capital agreement to purchase Raffles and Swissôtel interests, July 2005
Hospitality Net · Raffles International changes hands and enters new chapter, 30 September 2005
Lexpert · Delta Hotels acquired by bcIMC from Fairmont, 2 October 2007
Reuters · Kingdom sells Fairmont Raffles stake to Qatari Diar, 5 April 2010
Marriott International · Definitive agreement to acquire Delta Hotels and Resorts, 27 January 2015
Accor · FRHI acquisition investor presentation, 9 December 2015
Accor · Notice of the General Shareholders Meeting, 12 July 2016
Accor · Interim Financial Report, 30 June 2016
Accor · AccorHotels officially welcomes Fairmont, Raffles and Swissôtel, 12 July 2016
Accor · Interim Financial Report, 30 June 2017